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IS IT TIME FOR A CHANGE IN THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE? UNITED STA TES V. WILLIAMS AND
THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
Over seventy-five years ago in Weeks v. United States,' the United
States Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule by holding that un-
constitutionally obtained evidence could not be admitted in criminal
trials. Despite the rule's longevity, its justification remains uncertain 2
and its critics abound. Many commentators have suggested that the
rule should be sharply limited or even eliminated.3
In United States v. Williams4 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit limited the exclusionary rule significantly by creating
a good faith mistake exception to its application.5 Thirteen judges of
the en banc court held that evidence seized in contravention of the
fourth amendment is admissible in criminal trials if seized by police
officers acting under an objectively reasonable, good faith belief that
their actions are constitutionally authorized.6 The Williams court,
adopting the balancing test used in several recent Supreme Court
fourth amendment decisions,7 found that the harm to society caused by
1. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See notes 11-13 infra and accompanying text.
2. See notes 21-23 infra and accompanying text.
3. For example, Chief Justice Burger recently criticized the exclusionary rule in a speech
made at the American Bar Association Convention in Houston. The Chief Justice stated that "our
search for justice must not be twisted into an endless quest for technical errors unrelated to guilt or
innocence." N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1981, at AI, col. 4. President Reagan has also called for reform
of the "'exclusionary rule', which prohibits the use in court of illegally seized evidence, 'no matter
how guilty the defendant or how heinious the crime'." Id., Sept. 29, 1981, at Al, col. 4, cont. at
A19, col. 1. See also note 17 infra.
4. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
5. The majority opinion was divided into two parts. Part one, joined by 16 judges, held that
Williams' arrest and subsequent search were valid. This holding was sufficient in itself to uphold
the lower court's decision to admit the fruits of the search. 622 F.2d at 839. See notes 10 1-02 infra
and accompanying text. Part two, joined by 13 judges, created the good faith exception. 622 F.2d
at 840. See notes 103-04 infra and accompanying text.
6. 622 F.2d at 840.
7. See, e.g., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3 (1979) ("purpose of exclusionary
rule is to deter unlawful police conduct"); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754-55 (1979)
(rule rests primarily on judgment that deterring police conduct that may invade the constitutional
rights of individuals outweighs importance of securing conviction of specific defendant); United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (" 'prime purpose' of the rule, if not the sole one 'is to
deter future unlawful police conduct' "); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600 (1975) (" 'pur-
pose is to deter--to compel respect for the constitutional guarantee' "); United States v. Peltier,
422 U.S. 531, 538-39 (1975) (" 'rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives
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releasing criminals outweighed the limited deterrent effect of applying
the exclusionary rule to police officers' good faith mistakes.8 Therefore,
the court held that application of the exclusionary rule, under those
circumstances, was unjustified.9
This Note examines the Williams decision and the developing good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Section I reviews the prece-
dents and theoretical basis for the exclusionary rule. Section II exam-
ines the Williams decision itself. Section III explores the merit of a
good faith exception. Finally, this Note concludes in Section IV by
reviewing early judicial responses to the Williams decision and consid-
ering how the Supreme Court may react to the good faith exception.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF A BASIS FOR A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
A. Historical Development of the Exclusionary Rule
In its 1914 decision of Weeks v. United States,10 the Supreme Court
created the exclusionary rule by allowing a criminal defendant to peti-
tion for return of unconstitutionally seized property."I The Court rea-
soned that the judiciary should not sanction the use of the fruits of
unconstitutional police procedures. 12 In contrast to the Supreme
Court's current philosophy, deterrence of police misconduct was not an
explicit rationale underlying the Weeks opinion.
Thirty-five years later, in Wolf v. Colorado,13 the Court ruled that
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures was "implicit in the
were thought most efficaciously served' ") (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974).
8. 622 F.2d at 842-43.
9. Id at 843.
10. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
11. Id at 398.
12. Id at 392. The Weeks Court explained that "[the tendency of those who execute the
criminal laws of the country to obtain convictions by means of unlawful seizures... should find
no sanction in the judgment of the courts which are charged at all times with the support of the
Constitution." Id Some commentators have suggested that Weeks may have rested on a protec-
tion of privacy or property rationale. See Schlesinger & Wilson, Propert, Privacy and Deterrence:
The Exclusionary Rule in Search of a Rationale, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 225 (1980); 34 VAND. L. REv.
213 (1981).
Weeks did allow the use in federal court of evidence unconstitutionally seized by state officers.
232 U.S. at 398. This practice was subsequently outlawed in Elkins v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
(1921), in which the Court held that any evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment was
inadmissible in federal courts. Id at 312-13. See generally Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482-93
(1976) (brief history of exclusionary rule).
13. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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concept of ordered liberty"14 and therefore was applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. The Wolf decision also held, how-
ever, that states were not required to adopt the exclusionary rule as a
means to protect these fourth amendment fights.' 5 Three years later
the Court retreated partially from Woff by holding that state courts
should suppress evidence obtained from searches and seizures that
"shock[ed] the conscience."' 6 States remained free, however, to fashion
their own remedies for less egregious constitutional violations.
By 1961, however, the Supreme Court determined that this protec-
tion of fourth amendment fights was inadequate. Consequently, the
Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states in Mapp v. Ohio. 7
14. Id at 27-28.
15. Id at 31. The Court stated:
Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of deter-
ring unreasonable searches, it is not for this court to condemn as falling below minimal
standards assumed by the Due Process clause a state's reliance upon other methods
which if consistently enforced, would be equally effective.
Id
16. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952), held that evidence obtained by invol-
untarily pumping a defendant's stomach was inadmissible because the method used to obtain the
evidence was so outrageous that it violated due process.
17. 367 U.S. 643, 645-55 (1961). The Court held that the exclusionary rule was the only
effective method of enforcing the fourth amendment. Id at 652-53 (citing Irvine v. California, 347
U.S. 128, 137 (1954)). Recently, however, a number of suggestions have been advanced for re-
placing the current exclusionary rule with other deterrent devices. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Un-
known Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 421 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(tort remedy against government); ALI MODEL CODE FOR PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 290.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1975) (substantial violation test); Davidow, Criminal Procedure
Ombudsman as a Substitute for the Exclusionary Rule: A Proposal, 4 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 317
(1973) (special ombudsman to receive complaints and investigate violations); Davis, An Approach
to Legal Control ofthe Police, 52 TEx. L. REv. 703 (1974) (tort remedy against government and
police rulemaking); Foote, Tort Remediesfor Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L.
REV. 493 (1955) (civil tort remedy for violation); Kaplan, The Limts of the Exclusionary Rule, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1027 (1974) (rule inapplicable in serious cases and when police departments make
valid compliance effort); LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary Rule-
Part IL Dtfning the Norms and Training the Police, 30 Mo. L. REv. 566 (1965) (norm defining by
courts and legislatures and training of police); McGowan, Rule-Malking and the Police, 70 MICH.
L. REV. 659 (1972) (police rulemaking); Quinn, The Effect ofPolice Rulemaking on the Scope of
Fourth Amendment Rights, 52 J. URB. L. 25 (1974) (same); Roche, A Viable Substitutefor the
Exclusionary Rule: A Civil Rights Appeals Board, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 223 (1973) (statutory
remedy through an administrative board); Spiotto, The Search and Seizure Problem-Two Ap-
proaches: The Canadian Tort Remedy and the U.S. Exclusionary Rule, I J. POLICE SCL & AD. 36
(1973) (common-law tort remedy); Comment, The Federal Injunction as a Remedyfor Unconstitu-
tional Police Conduct, 78 YALE LJ. 143 (1968) (court injunction as remedy to unconstitutional
police conduct); 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 104 (federal courts grant injunction against further police
misconduct).
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The Mapp opinion advanced two justifications for the exclusionary
rule. First, the Court reasoned that the exclusion of unlawfully ob-
tained evidence would remove the incentive for police officers to vio-
late fourth amendment rights."8 Second, the Court stated that the
odmission of illegally seized evidence would damage "judicial
integrity.' 19
18. 367 U.S. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1959)). This concept
of deterrence differs markedly from that maintained by many critics of the exclusionary rule. The
critics tend to focus on the rule's punishment of individual police officers rather than its ability to
eliminate the police's incentive to violate the fourth amendment. Chief Justice Burger's statement
that the rule "does not apply any direct sanction to the individual officer whose illegal conduct
results in the exclusion, and so cannot 'deter' him" typifies the individual deterrence view. Bivens
v. Six Unknown Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 417 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). But see United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 556-58 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 431 (1974).
The extent of the rule's deterrent effect is unknown. The Court has stated that "although schol-
ars have attempted to determine whether the exclusionary rule in fact does have any deterrent
effect, each empirical study on the subject, in its own way, appears to be flawed." United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 449-50 (1975). The most comprehensive study of the deterrent effect of the
exclusionary rule is Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CH. L.
REV. 665 (1970). Oaks noted: "The foregoing findings represent the largest fund of information
yet assembled on the effect of the exclusionary rule, but they obviously fall short of an empirical
substantiation or refutation of the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule." Id at 709. Despite
his lack of persuasive evidence, Oaks concluded that the "exclusionary rule should be abolished."
Id at 755.
In contrast to Oaks see Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and
a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974). Professor Canon concluded that
"the exclusionary rule is in considerably better health than some of its 'attendant physicians'
would have us believe." Id at 729. Canon, however, also admitted the inconclusiveness of his
data. Id at 725.
One commentator reviewed the available empirical studies and concluded that after all "factors
are considered, there is virtually no likelihood that the Court is going to receive any 'relevant
statistics' which objectively measure the 'practical' efficacy of the exclusionary rule." Critique, On
the Limitations Of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Splotto Re-
search and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 740, 763-64 (1974). See also Goldstein,
Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low- isibility Decisions in the.Administration
of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960); Kamisar, On the Tactics oPolice-Prosecution Oriented Crit-
ics of the Courts, 49 CORNELL L. REv. 436 (1964); Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties.-
Some "Facts" and "Theories," 53 J. CRIM. L.C. & P. S. 171 (1962); Katz, The Supreme Court and
the States: An Inquiry into Mapp v. Ohio in North Carolina, 45 N.C.L. REv. 119 (1966); Nagel,
Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 283; Paulsen, The
Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct of the Police, 52 J. CRam. L.C. & P. S. 255 (1961); Spiotto,
Search and Seizure" An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL
STuD. 243 (1973); Weinstein, Local Responsibilityfor Improvement of Search and Seizure Prac-
tices, 34 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 150 (1962); Comment, Effect ofMapp v. Ohio on Police Search and
Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 87 (1968).
19. 367 U.S. at 659. The Court quoted Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in a previous
case. "Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/6
Number 1] EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The Supreme Court did not identify which of the two rationales was
the primary basis for the Mapp decision." This omission left both
courts and commentators21 uncertain about the social goals the rule
was designed to serve. This confusion has produced a conflict between
supporters of the deterrence rationale, who believe the rule is only a
deterrent device that can be discarded when it fails to deter,' and sup-
porters of the judicial integrity rationale, who believe that the rule is
constitutionally compelled and thus may never be disregarded.23 This
dispute is frustrated by a lack of empirical evidence. There is no evi-
dence demonstrating the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a de-
terrent to police misconduct. Similarly, there is a lack of empirical
whole people by its example.... If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt
for the law, it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Mapp may contain a third justification for the exclusionary rule. The Court might have consid-
ered the rule a personal constitutional right of the accused. The Court stated that the exclusionary
rule is "part and parcel of the fourth amendment's limitations upon [governmental] encroachment
of individual privacy." 367 U.S. at 651. In addition, the Court stated that the exclusionary rule is
"an essential part of both the fourth and fourteenth amendments." Id at 657. The Supreme
Court, however, rejected this interpretation of Mapp in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974), in which the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the
injury to the privacy of the search victim." Id at 347. But see id at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. Oaks, supra note 18, at 670. Justice Black's reliance on a self-incrimination theory split
the majority, leaving the primary basis for the opinion unresolved. 367 U.S. at 661.
21. See, eg., Schrock & Welsh, Upfrom Calandra The Excusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REV. 251, 265 (1974) ("Court persistently relied on an unstable combi-
nation of arguments"); Sunderland, he Exclusionary Rule: .4 Requirement of Constitutional Prn-
ciple, 69 J. Cium. L. & CRIMONOLOOY 141, 144 (1978) ("not entirely clear what the Court intends
as its primary rationale"). See generally W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 14-20 (1978).
22. See, eg., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 413 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Oaks, supra
note 18, at 670-73.
23. Monrad Paulsen is typical of those who support the judicial integrity rationale:
The moral point not only rests upon an ethical judgment that governmental hypocrisy is
an evil to be avoided for its own sake, but also it takes into account the serious under-
mining of trust in government which is an unavoidable consequence of any scheme per-
mitting the state to benefit from unlawful conduct.
Paulsen, supra note 18, at 258. See also Monroe, The Imperative of Judicial Integrity and the
Exclusionary Rule, 4 W. ST. U.L. REv. 1 (1976); Comment, Judicial Integrity and Judicial Re-
view- An Argumentfor Expanding the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1129
(1973); 1977 WAsH. U.L.Q. 127. Detractors of the judicial integrity doctrine question "how we
can in good conscience derive satisfaction from the shining purity of our courts where they are
surrounded by squalid and frightening crime--crime the government cannot combat because of
the court's preoccupation with its own integrity." Shrock & Welsh, supra note 21, at 265. Com-
mentators have also noted that the exclusionary rule is not recognized in other common-law juris-
dictions whose court systems are regarded as models of "decorum and fairness." Oaks, supra note
18, at 669.
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evidence as to the efficacy of the rule in diminishing disrespect for gov-
ernment24 and thus decreasing civil disobedience.25
B. The Emergence of Deterrence as the Primary Justlfcation for the
Exclusionary Rule
The Court adopted the deterrence theory as the primary rationale for
the exclusionary rule in Linkletter v. Walker.26 Linkletter involved a
habeas corpus petition by a state prisoner whose conviction was based
on illegally seized evidence.27 Although Linkletter's conviction pre-
dated Mapp, he filed his habeas corpus petition after that decision was
announced. 28  The Court denied the petition, thereby allowing a con-
viction obtained with illegally obtained evidence to stand.29 Commen-
tators have interpreted the Linkletter decision to imply that the use of
evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment is neither inher-
ently unconstitutional nor necessarily an infringement of judicial
integrity.30
The Supreme Court conclusively reaffirmed deterrence as the pri-
mary rationale for the exclusionary rule in Harris v. New York.31 The
majority opinion in Harris upheld the admission into evidence of a
criminal defendant's testimony given before he received Miranda32
warnings.33  The only justification for the exclusionary rule that the
24. See, eg., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("enabling the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness"); Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1921) ("even less should the federal courts be accomplices in the willful
disobedience of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold").
25. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in government"); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 653, 659 (1961) ("[n]othing else can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws").
26. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
27. Id at 621.
28. Id
29. Id at 640.
30. See, ag., McGowen, supra note 17, at 674 n.46; Oaks, supra note 18, at 670-71; Note,
Excluding the Exclusionary Rule: CongressionalAssault on Mapp v. Ohio, 61 GEo. L.J. 1453, 1457
(1973); Comment, Stamdnglo Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. Cm. L. REv.
342, 352-56 (1967). Several other early cases recognized exceptions to the exclusionary rule. See,
ag., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
31. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
32. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda requires that criminal suspects be
advised of their constitutional rights before questioning by police. Id at 467-68.
33. 401 U.S. at 226.
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Court discussed was deterrence of police misconduct,34 although a
strong dissent contended that "it [was] monstrous that courts should aid
or abet a law breaking police officer."
3
Although Harris was concerned only with the exclusionary rule in
the fifth amendment context, its reasoning applies to fourth amend-
ment cases as well.36 Chief Justice Burger used reasoning similar to
that in Harris in his dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics,37 in which he contended that the exclu-
sionary rule should be abolished as soon as an effective alternative was
found.38 The Chief Justice premised his dissent upon the contention
that deterrence, not judicial integrity, was the only valid justification
for the exclusionary rule. 9
Three years later, in United States v. Calandra,4' the Court indicated
once again that deterrence was the "prime purpose" of the exclusionary
rule.4 1 In Calandra, the Court refused to extend the exclusionary rule
to grand jury proceedings, because it believed that applying the rule to
disallow questions based upon tainted evidence would not deter illegal
police activity.42 The majority opinion did not even mention judicial
integrity. In a strong dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the admis-
sion of illegally seized evidence would taint the judiciary.43 Justice
Brennan also argued that the exclusionary rule was a right personal to
34. Id at 225. The Court stated: "Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect
on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made
unavoidable to the prosecution in its case in chief." Id
35. Id at 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. Harri was cited by the Williams court as precedent for its decision. United States v.
Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 841 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
37. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
38. 403 U.S. at 411-27 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger had expressed his
views on the exclusionary rule nearly seven years earlier in a speech at American University. See
Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964).
39. 403 U.S. at 413.
40. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
41. Id at 347.
42. Id at 354. The Court stated: "In the context of a grand jury proceeding, we believe that
the damage to that institution from the unprecedented extension of the exclusionary rule urged by
respondent outweighs the benefit of any possible incremental deterrent effect." Id
43. 414 U.S. at 357 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
The exclusionary rule, if not perfect, accomplished the twin goals of enabling the judi-
ciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people-
all potential victims of unlawful government conduct-that the government would not
profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of undermining popular trust in
government.
Id (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the defendant, not just a societal prophylactic." The Calandra major-
ity opinion, however, completely rejected the judicial integrity theory
and adopted a balancing test in which the deterrent effect of the exclu-
sionary rule was weighed against the societal costs of exclusion.45
Since the adoption of the Calandra balancing test, the Court has
steadily eroded the exclusionary rule. The Court refused to apply the
exclusionary rule in several situations in which it determined that the
benefits of exclusion were outweighed by the social costs. For example,
Peltier v. United States46 established the technical good faith exception.
A year later, in United States v. Janis,47 the Court refused to extend the
rule to prevent the use in federal civil proceedings of evidence illegally
seized by state agencies. In the same year the Court, in Stone v. Pow-
ell,48 eliminated federal habeas corpus review of fourth amendment
claims that had been reviewed fully in state courts. In United States v.
Caceres,49 the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence
seized in violation of a voluntarily promulgated administrative regula-
44. 414 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that "the exclusionary
rule is part and parcel of the fourth amendment's limitation upon governmental encroachments of
individual privacy." Id (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority rejected this theory: "The pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim." Id at 347.
See note 19 supra. See generally Cann & Egbert, The Exclusionary Rule. Its Necessity in a Cons/i.
tutionalDemocracy, 23 How. L.J. 299 (1980); Schrock & Welsh, supra note 21; Sunderland, supra
note 21.
45. 414 U.S. at 348 ("the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its
remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served").
46. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
47. 428 U.S. 433 (1976). Although good faith was mentioned several times in the opinion,
this was not the basis of the holding. 428 U.S. at 434, 453. One commentator has suggested that
the reference to good faith in Janis may have been part of the Court's effort to establish a good
faith mistake exception. See Note, Impending "Fren/al Assaul/" on the Citadel- The Supreme
Cour/t' Readiness to Modfy the S/rict Exclusionary Rule ofthe Fourth Amendment to a Good Faith
Standard, 12 TULSA L.J. 337 (1976).
48. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See notes 76-81 infra and accompanying text.
49. 440 U.S. 741 (1979). The Court thus created a good faith mistake exception for violation
of administrative agency regulations designed to protect the privacy of citizens. In Caceres, IRS
agents electronically monitored a taxpayer's conversations without securing proper IRS intra-
agency approval. Id at 742-43. The defendant argued that the IRS's failure to comply with its
own regulations required exclusion of the evidence obtained by the surveillance. Id at 750. The
Court held that the IRS rules were not constitutionally mandated and that the monitoring was
therefore not a constitutional violation. Id at 756-57. The Court stated in dicta that if there were
an exclusionary rule applicable to violations of agency regulations, the defendant's motion for
suppression would still not be granted because the IRS officers had attempted to comply with the
rules in good faith. Id at 757. This would represent a true good faith mistake exception, although
it differs from Williams because no violation of constitutional rights occurred.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol60/iss1/6
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
tion. Most recently, in Michigan v. DeFillppo,50 the Court refused to
suppress evidence seized in good faith reliance upon an unconstitu-
tional statute.
The adoption of deterrence as the exclusionary rule's prime rationale
laid the groundwork for the development of both a technical and a
good faith mistake exception. If the Court had viewed the exclusionary
rule as a personal right necessary to maintain judicial integrity, the
good faith mistake rule could not have evolved. Because the Court
views deterrence as the sole rationale for the exclusionary rule, police
officers' good faith errors, which cannot be deterred, fall within a good
faith exception.
C. Supreme Court Adoption of a Technical Violation Exception
Soon after the Supreme Court adopted the Calandra balancing test,
the technical violation exception emerged. A technical violation occurs
when a police officer conducts a search in reliance on a statute or war-
rant later declared invalid. 1 The technical violation exception permits
evidence discovered during such a search to be admitted at trial.5 2 The
rule reflects the Court's refusal to apply the exclusionary rule when it
would not deter police misconduct. Police relying on a seemingly valid
statute or warrant cannot know that their actions are unconstitutional
and thus cannot be effectively deterred. 3
The Supreme Court first mentioned the technical good faith excep-
tion in Michigan v. Tucker. 4 The constitutional violation in Tucker
occurred when police took a statement from a criminal suspect without
affording the suspect Miranda55 warnings.56 The suspect's statements
led to the discovery of a witness who gave inculpatory testimony.5 7 Be-
50. 443 U.S. 31 (1979). See notes 67-71 infra and accompanying text.
51. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 940-44 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
The distinction between "technical violations" and "good faith mistake violations" was explained
in Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amenahent: The "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary
Rule, 69 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOoY 635 (1978). The Williams court extended the technical
violation exception to invalid warrants although prior Supreme Court decisions had only ex-
tended the exception to searches based on unconstitutional statutes. 622 F.2d at 940-44. See notes
54-71 infra and accompanying text.
52. See Ball, supra note 51, at 565.
53. Id
54. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
55. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
56. See note 32 supra.
57. 417 U.S. at 436-37.
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cause the interrogation took place before the Court's decision in Mi-
randa, the officer acted in compliance with then-existing law. 8 The
Court held that the witness could testify despite the tainted way in
which the police discovered him.5 9 The decision was based, in part, on
the police officer's good faith in taking the witness' statement.
60
The Supreme Court adopted a fourth amendment technical good
faith exception in United States v. Peltier.61 Although the opinion con-
cemed the retroactivity of an earlier border search case,62 the Peltier
Court weighed heavily the good faith63 of border guards who relied
upon a warrantless search statute that was later declared unconstitu-
tional.64 After the law authorizing an initial search and arrest was de-
clared unconstitutional, the defendant brought suit to overturn his
conviction.65 The Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment vio-
lation, caused by reliance on a statute that had not yet been declared
unconstitutional, did not warrant retroactive application of the exclu-
sionary rule.66
58. Id Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), was the controlling law at the time of the
defendant's questioning. It did not require, as did Miranda, that a defendant be apprised of his
constitutional rights. 378 U.S. at 492.
59. 417 U.S. at 445-46.
60. Id at 447. The Court stated.
The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have
engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defend-
ant of some right. By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of such conduct, the
courts hope to instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future counter-
parts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused. Where the official action
was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrence rationale loses much of its
force.
Id Other factors might have entered into the Court's decision, including the voluntariness of the
defendant's statement and the reliability of the evidence. Id at 445-49. A concurring opinion
suggests that the decision might have rested on retroactivity principles. I at 453-59 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). See generally Ball, supra note 51, at 651-52.
61. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
62. The Peltier Court refused to retroactively apply its decision in Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 422 U.S. at 535.
63. 422 U.S. at 537-38. The Court stated: "Mhe introduction of evidence which had been
seized by law enforcement officials in good faith compliance with then prevailing constitutional
norms did not make the courts 'accomplices in the willful disobedience of the Constitution they
are sworn to uphold."' Id at 536 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1959)).
64. 422 U.S. at 532-33. The statute and regulations in question authorized warrantless bor-
der searches without probable cause up to 200 miles from the border. Id at 533. The statute and
regulations were declared unconstitutional in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973).
65. 422 U.S. at 533.
66. Id at 532.
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Four years later, in Michigan v. DeFRil1po,67 the Supreme Court
again recognized a technical good faith exception. The Court sustained
a state court decision to admit evidence seized during an arrest made in
reliance on an unconstitutional law.68 Because it believed that the ex-
clusionary rule was an ineffective deterrent under these circumstances,
the Supreme Court expressly adopted a good faith technical violation
exception to the rule.69 The opinion, however, also noted that police
officers could not consider the constitutionality of laws when making
arrests.70 Because of the Court's reliance on this alternative rationale,
DeFillppo is not a clear mandate for a good faith mistake exception.71
D. Express Supreme Court Support for a Good Faith Mistake
Exception
The Supreme Court has not yet adopted a good faith mistake excep-
tion. Nevertheless, support of such a rule has appeared in two opin-
ions. Although the majority opinion in Brown v. Illinois72 did not
discuss the good faith exception,73 Justice Powell's concurrence argued
that the exclusionary rule should not apply to good faith violations. 74
67. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
68. Id at 40 ("subsequently determined invalidity of the Detroit ordinance on vagueness
grounds does not undermine the validity of the arrest made for violation of that ordinance").
69. Id at 38 n.3. The Court stated: "No conceivable purpose of deterrence would be served
by suppressing evidence which, at the time it was found on the person of the respondent, was the
product of a lawful arrest and a lawful search." Id See aso 7 Oio N.U.L. REv. 170, 175-76
(1980); 55 WASH. L. REv. 849, 860-61 (1980).
70. 443 U.S. at 38. The Court stated:
Police are charged to enforce laws until and unless they are declared unconstitutional.
The enactment of a law forecloses speculation by enforcement officers concerning its
constitutionality-with the possible exception of a law so grossly and flagrantly unconsti-
tutional that any person of reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws. Society
would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon themselves to determine which laws
are and are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement.
Id The Court also analogizedto Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), in which the Court held that
police who relied in good faith on a presumptively valid law could not be found civilly liable for
damages resulting from a deprivation of fourth amendment rights. Id at 557.
71. A good faith mistake is an error in judgment by a police officer. The validity of the law
under which the search was mistakenly made is irrelevant. See note 51 supra and accompanying
text. In addition, the wider applicability of a good faith mistake exception and other policy con-
siderations limit DeFillppo's value as precedent for a good faith mistake exception. See notes
127-65 infra and accompanying text.
72. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
73. The majority dealt with whether a Miroada warning has the force to break the causal
chain between an illegal arrest and a defendant's incriminating statements. Id at 591-605.
74. Id at 612. Justice Powell stated.
"The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have
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Justice Powell dismissed any concern for judicial integrity, arguing that
a court's integrity is not compromised by admission of evidence ob-
tained by a good faith mistake.7" Justice White's dissent in Stone v.
Powefll6 also suggested a good faith mistake exception. Although the
facts in Stone presented a technical good faith violation,77 the Court
decided the case on other grounds.78 Justice White dissented, advocat-
ing an exception to the exclusionary rule for both "technical" and
"good faith mistake" violations.7 9 He argued that a police officer who
in good faith does not know that his actions are illegal cannot be rea-
sonably expected to conform to fourth amendment requirements. 0
The dissent believed that deterrence was the primary rationale for the
exclusionary rule. Citing both technical and good faith mistake situa-
tions that result in "recurrent" violations,," Justice White concluded
that "in these situations and perhaps many others, excluding evidence
will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule." 2
Although the Supreme Court has established the necessary rationale
for a good faith mistake exception" and has allowed the admission of
evidence seized in good faith reliance on an unconstitutional statute,8 4
it has not yet allowed the use of evidence seized in violation of fourth
engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the defend-
ant of some right." In cases in which this underlying premise is lacking, the deterrence
rationale of the exclusionary rule does not obtain, and I can see no legitimate justifica-
tion for depriving the prosecution of probative and reliable evidence.
Id (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)).
75. 422 U.S. at 611.
76. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
77. Id at 469. The defendant in Stone was arrested for violating an unconstitutional va-
grancy ordinance. The search incident to the arrest produced incriminating evidence. Id
78. Id at 494-95. The Court refused to extend the exclusionary rule to federal habeas corpus
proceedings because of the limited increase in deterrence that would be achieved. Id
79. Id at 538. Justice White cited several circumstances resulting in good faith violations,
including searches based on laws later declared unconstitutional and searches based on a reason-
able but mistaken judgment of probable cause. Id Justice White concluded: 'These are recur-
ring situations; and recurringly evidence is excluded without any realistic expectation that its
exclusion will contribute in the slightest to the purposes of the rule, even though the trial will be
seriously affected or the indictment dismissed." Id
80. Id at 537-40. Justice White stated that "it is painfully apparent that.., the officer is
acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances. Excluding the evi-
dence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty."
Id at 539-40.
81. Id at 537-38.
82. Id at 539.
83. See notes 26-51 supra and accompanying text.
84. See notes 51-71 supra and accompanying text.
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amendment rights because of a good faith mistake. 85
I. UNITED STATES V WILLIAMS
United States v. Williams86 presented a good faith mistake fact situa-
tion. A Drug Enforcement Association (DEA)87 agent on duty in the
Atlanta International Airport recognized the defendant, Williams, be-
cause the officer had previously arrested her for possession of heroin.88
The agent knew that Williams was at liberty on bond pending the ap-
peal of a prior conviction. A condition of her bond was that she remain
in Ohio.89
The agent arrested Williams for violating the travel restrictions of
her bond and searched her as an incident to that arrest.9° He found a
packet of heroin in her pocket and arrested her for violation of the
Controlled Substances Act.91 The DEA agent subsequently secured a
warrant for the search of her bags. A search of the bags produced a
large quantity of heroin.92
The defendant moved to suppress all the evidence found in connec-
tion with her arrest because the agent had no power to arrest her for
violating the travel restriction.93 This argument found support in the
statute defining the arrest powers of DEA agents, 94 which did not au-
85. See, ag., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (good faith mistake in granting search
warrant requires suppression); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (error in search
warrant requires suppression); Aguiler v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (same). Chief Justice Burger
has stated that "the rule has long been applied to wholly good faith mistakes and to purely techni-
cal deficiencies in warrants." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 499 (1976) (Burger, CJ., concurring).
86. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
87. Id at 834.
88. Id at 833. Williams had been arrested by the DEA agent in Ohio for possession of
heroin. After the District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied her motion to suppress,
she pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three years imprisonment. She appealed the denial of her
motion to suppress to the Sixth Circuit. The district court ordered Williams released pending
appeal, with the condition that she remain in Ohio. Id
89. Id at 834.
90. Id
91. Id Williams was charged with a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
92. 622 F.2d at 835.
93. Id She contended that because her arrest was unlawful, the evidence seized during the
search incident to the arrest should be suppressed. She also contended that the warrant authoriz-
ing the search of her bags was invalid because it was based on information obtained from the
search of her person. Id
94. 21 U.S.C. § 878(3) (1976) provides:
Any officer or employee of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drug [sic] desig-
nated by the Attorney General may-
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thorize arrest for criminal contempt. 95 The district court granted the
defendant's motion9 6 and a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed.97 The Court of Appeals then reheard the case en banc
and reversed the panel.98
The en banc court divided its opinion into two parts. The first part
held that the DEA agent had the power to arrest Williams for violating
her travel restriction9 9 and that, therefore, the search was incident to a
valid arrest."°° This holding disposed of the case, but thirteen judges101
of the twenty-four judge panel joined in a second part of the opinion
that announced, as an alternative ground for decision, a good faith mis-
take exception to the exclusionary rule." 2
The Fifth Circuit's analysis of the good faith exception resembled
that used in previous Supreme Court decisions limiting the exclusion-
ary rule.103 The court first rejected any argument that the exclusionary
rule was a constitutional requirement. 1°4 Although some commenta-
(3) make arrests without warrant (A) for any offense against the United States
committed in his presence, or (B) for any felony, cognizable under the Laws of the
United States, if he has probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed or is committing a felony ....
Id
95. 622 F.2d at 835.
96. Id. at 835. The district court held that DEA agents do not have the power to arrest for
violation of travel restrictions.
97. United States v. Williams, 594 F.2d 86, 96 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127
(1981). The panel agreed with the district court and held that DEA agents do not have the power
to arrest for contempt. Id. One judge dissented and argued for a good faith mistake exception.
Id. at 97-98 (Clark, J., dissenting).
98. 622 F.2d at 833.
99. Id. at 839.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 840.
102. Id.
103. See, eg., Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (use of evidence obtained by good
faith reliance on unconstitutional ordinance); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979) (use of
evidence obtained through good faith violation of administrative agency regulation); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (habeas corpus review of state court decisions based on illegally seized
evidence); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (use of evidence illegally seized by state
agencies in federal civil proceeding); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (retroactive
application of exclusionary rule); United States v Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (use of illegally
seized evidence in grand jury proceedings); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (use of
illegally obtained statements to impeach testimony).
104. 622 F.2d at 841 (citing Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976); United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
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tors and Justices disagreed on this point,105 the Supreme Court has now
clearly established the proposition.Y° 6 Next, the Fifth Circuit noted
that it recognized deterrence as the only justification for the rule.107
Thus, the court could premise its good faith exception on a finding that
a police officer "will not be deterred from an illegal search if he does
not know it is illegal."10
The Williams court justified its adoption of a good faith mistake ex-
ception by citing two Supreme Court opinions. Both opinions, how-
ever, fail to support the Williams decision."° The first, United States v.
Janis,110 held that in federal civil proceedings the exclusionary rule
should not be applied to evidence illegally seized by state officials.'
Although the Supreme Court framed the issue in Janis in terms of good
faith, 12 the actual holding did not rely on this concept. As such, the
Janis opinion provides only limited support for the Williams holding.
The Court next cited Michigan v. Tucker,1 3 which referred to good
faith mistakes but was decided on "technical" violation grounds.' 1 4
The court also cited two Fifth Circuit opinions, United States v.
Hill' and United States v. Wo/f,1" both of which failed to support
the good faith mistake exception. Hill involved a police officer's failure
to place information necessary to establish probable cause in an affida-
vit that was used to obtain a search warrant. 1 7 The magistrate supple-
mented the affidavit with oral testimony before issuing the warrant." 8
The defendant argued on appeal that Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
105. See notes 19 & 23-24 spra and accompanying text.
106. See cases cited in note 103 supra.
107. 622 F.2d at 842. Ten judges entered a special concurrence to the majority opinion. Writ-
ing for the group, Judge Rubin argued that the exclusionary rule is both a personal right and
necessary to protect judicial integrity. Id. at 848-50 (Rubin, J., concurring specially). Judge
Rubin also characterized the decision as "hypothetical" and objected to the modification of the
exclusionary rule as an alternative ground for decision. Id. (Rubin, J., concurring specially).
108. Id. at 842.
109. Id. at 844-45.
110. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
111. Id at 454. The Janis result rests on the minimal increase in deterrence that could be
expected by refusing to allow the use of evidence illegally seized by state officials in federal civil
actions. Id.
112. Id. at 434.
113. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
114. See notes 54-60 mpra and accompanying text.
115. 500 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975).
116. 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979).
117. 500 F.2d at 319.
118. Id. at 320.
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dure 41(c)' 9 prohibited oral supplementation of an affidavit.12 0  Al-
though the court held that oral supplementation was permissible, it also
indicated that a technical violation of Rule 4 1(c) would not justify sup-
pression of the evidence in any case.' 2 ' As a result, Hill is, at most,
precedent only for the technical violation exception to the exclusionary
rule.
In Wofs the Fifth Circuit refused to fashion an exclusionary rule for
the violation of a federal statute." The case involved federal officers
who, in violation of the Federal Posse Comitatus Act,12 had partici-
pated in the enforcement of a state law. Fourth amendment rights were
not at issue,2 4 and the court did not rely on fourth amendment prece-
dent as authority for its decision." Moreover, the holding of Woo'9s
rested on the unique nature of the violation, not the federal agents'
good faith. 26
Thus, Williams was decided on the basis of precedent that suggested,
but did not compel, adoption of a good faith exception to the exclusion-
ary rule. The Supreme Court opinions cited by the Williams court
clearly hold that the exclusionary rule should not apply in situations in
which the social costs of exclusion outweigh its deterrent effect. 127
Nevertheless, it is not certain that the Supreme Court, when it is con-
119. FED. R. CRim. P. 41(c) provides:
(c) Issuance and Contents.
(1) Warrant Upon 4ffidavil. A warrant... shall issue only on an affidavit sworn
to before the federal magistrate or state judge and establishing the grounds for issu-
ing the warrant. If the federal magistrate or state judge is satisfied that grounds for
the application exist or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he
shall issue a warrant identifying the property or person to be seized and naming or
describing the person or place to be searched.
120. 500 F.2d at 320.
121. Id. at 321-22.
122. 594 F.2d at 85.
123. Id. at 84-85 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1976)).
124. Id at 84-85.
125. United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372,376-77 (4th Cir. 1974); State v. Danko, 219 Kan.
490,496-97, 548 P.2d 819, 824-25 (1976) (quoting United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d at 376-77).
The Walden court identified four factors that distinguished a fourth amendment violation from a
violation of the Posse Comitatus Act: (1) the proscription of the use of military personnel to
enforce civilian laws is not widely known, (2) the proscription is not designed to protect individu-
als, (3) the act prohibited is not inherently wrong, and (4) the case is unique. 490 F.2d at 376-77.
126. 490 F.2d at 377 ("this case is the first instance to our knowledge in which military person-
nel have been used as the principal investigators of civilian crimes in violation of the
Instruction!).
127. See note 103 supra.
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fronted with the issue, will conclude that a good faith exception is
justified.
Hm. ANALYSIS
Advocates of a good faith exception argue that deterrence is the
prime justification for the exclusionary rule. 12 8 They weigh the harm to
society in releasing a suspected criminal against the deterrence of
fourth amendment violations achieved by suppression.129 Because it is
impossible for the exclusionary rule to deter a police officer from com-
mitting a violation he does not know he is committing, 130 proponents of
the good faith exception are not unreasonable in advocating limitations
on the rule when police officers commit good faith violations.
Some supporters of a good faith exception also cite proportionality
131
as a justification for a good faith exception. Proportionality concerns
the perceived unfairness of a criminal escaping punishment for a possi-
bly serious crime because of a minor infringement of his fourth amend-
ment rights.132 To the public at large, this is perhaps the most serious
indictment of the exclusionary rule.
133
A related reason for limiting the rule is that it may engender disre-
spect for the law in its present form. Proponents of limitation argue
128. See, ag., Ball,supra note 51, at 650. Professor Ball states: "To the extent that this exalta-
tion of the deterrence rationale is accepted, it destroys the reason for suppression whenever the
sanction cannot be demonstrated to have at least a potential deterrent effect." Id See also note 18
supra.
129. See Ball, supra note 51, at 650. See generall, note 7 supra and accompanying text.
130. See, ag., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) ("excluding the
evidence can in no way affect his future conduct"); Wright, Must the Crim'nal Go Free if the
Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. RLv. 736, 740 (1972) ("[a] police officer will not be deterred from
an illegal search if he does not know it is illegal").
131. See H. HART, LAW, LiBERTY ND MoRArry 37 (1963). Professor Hart states:
"[P]rinciples of justice or fairness between different offenders require morally distinguishable of-
fenses to be treated differently and morally similar offenses to be treated alike." Id.
132. See, eg., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (noted disparity between error committed
and windfall received by defendant); H. FRIENDLY, BENClMARKS 260 (1967) (maximum penalty
should not be enforced for mistake in judgment); Kaplan, supra note 17, at 1036 (affront to ideas
of justice).
133. Professor Kaplan has maintained:
Popular hostility toward the rule arises from much more than the fact that it interferes
with our punishing people we regard as guilty. The disparity in particular cases between
the error committed by the police officer and the windfall given by the rule to the crimi-
nal is an affront to popular ideas of justice.... Proportionality is a major element of
our sense of justice.
Kaplan, supra note 17, at 1036.
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that the spectacle of a criminal being released because of a minor mis-
take by a police officer makes the law appear inept and insensitive to
society's values. 134 Commentators have suggested that considerable re-
form of the rule may be necessary to insure its continued existence. 135
Critics of the good faith exception oppose its adoption on constitu-
tional and practical grounds. Some argue that the exclusionary rule
enjoys constitutional stature 136 that renders its effectiveness as a deter-
rent irrelevant. Courts cannot ignore constitutional rights simply to ad-
vance other societal goals. 137 Although Justice Brennan has adopted
this view,' 38 the Supreme Court majority has held that "the rule is a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard fourth amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal con-
stitutional right of the party aggrieved."'
139
Critics of the good faith exception also try to revive the Court's early
concern for judicial integrity. 4° They reiterate the argument that the
use of unconstitutionally seized evidence in court diminishes the judici-
ary's prestige 14 and invites disrespect for the law,142 possibly with dis-
astrous consequences.143  In particular, judicial integrity supporters
emphasize the incongruity of a judiciary, sworn to uphold the Constitu-
tion, that sanctions the use of evidence taken in violation of the Consti-
tution.' 44 This argument is unlikely to succeed, however, because the
134. Id.
135. See Kaplan, supra note 17, at 1050. Professor Kaplan states:
For those who are wedded to the present rule, and even more for those who would
expand it, any restriction would be a retreat in the face of the enemy, a cutting back
when it is most necessary to hold firm. A cutting back of the exclusionary rule, however,
can also be regarded as a pruning, a method of making it more acceptable and hence
more lasting; it is indeed a method of giving more, not less, protection to fourth amend-
ment values.
Id.
136. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
137. See Ball, supra note 51, at 651. Professor Ball comments: "in summary, if the exclusion-
ary rule is constitutionally mandated, it could not be disregarded on occasions when it does not
further deterrent goals. Exclusion would be required in any case in which there had been a viola-
tion of constitutional rights, including those cases involving good faith violations." Id.
138. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
139. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
140. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
141. See note 24 .supra and accompanying text.
142. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
143. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
144. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 360 (1974) (Brennan, 3., dissenting), Justice
Brennan suggested that limitation of the exclusionary rule "openly invites '[t]he conviction that all
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Court probably will not reconsider its holding in United States v.
Peltier that judicial integrity is not offended by the admission of evi-
dence seized in good faith.'4 5
Critics of the good faith exception also attack its workability on the
grounds that it will destroy the deterrent effect of the rule, encourage
police misconduct, be difficult to administer, and retard development of
the fourth amendment. Deterrence will be destroyed, they argue, if
there is a good faith exception, because police officers will be tempted
to search in questionable or borderline cases in the hope that the courts
will admit the evidence. Critics argue that the exclusionary rule is
designed to deter police misconduct by removing the incentive to
search in violation of a citizen's rights.'" To the extent that there is
any possibility for the admission of illegally seized evidence, officers
will be encouraged to violate fourth amendment rights, 147 and the ex-
clusionary rule will have failed in its essential purpose.
There are only two circumstances in which the good faith exception
can be expected to undercut the deterrent effect of the exclusionary
rule. First, a police officer may decide to search despite his doubts
about the validity of the search, although he would not have searched
under the current exclusionary rule.1 48 Second, a police officer may be
willing to lie about his state of mind, thereby fabricating good faith.149
government is staffed by. . .hypocrites, [a conviction] easy to instill and difficult to erase.' Id.
(quoting Paulsen, supra note 23, at 258).
145. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 537, 541-42 (1975).
146. See, ag., Amsterdam, supra note 18, at 431. But see Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of
the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
147. See, ag., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 557 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
148. See Ball, supra note 51, at 654. "If a law is ambiguous and could reasonably be read to
validate a seizure, officers will be encouraged to opt for the interpretation which may compromise
fourth amendment rights." Id See generally United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 559 (Brennan,
J,, dissenting).
149. See Ball supra note 51, at 655. One commentator has suggested that the police already
have many opportunities to perjure themselves to effect admission of evidence unconstitutionally
seized and that one more opportunity will not increase the overall amount of dishonesty. See
Israel, Criminal Procedure, The Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L.
Rav. 1319, 1414 n.396 (1977). It is impossible to measure the effect of a good faith exception on
police behavior, although a police officer can lie about his state of mind more easily than he can
lie about the objective facts of an arresL The Vlliams objective good faith test might control this
problem. 622 F.2d at 840. A police officer would not only need to testify convincingly regarding
his subjective good faith, but he would have to prove it was also objectively reasonable. The need
to satisfy both prongs of the test would limit the number of opportunities for perjury, although
police assertions of good faith would be difficult to disprove. See generally Theis, "GoodFaith" as
a Defense to Suitsfor Police Deprivations of Inavidual Rights, 59 MNN. L. REV. 991 (1975).
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In either circumstance Williams will require that a court be satisfied
that the good faith "mistake" was objectively reasonable.150 It seems
reasonable to assume that there will be some increase in judicially-
sanctioned fourth amendment violations.151 This increase, however, is
not a conclusive indictment of the good faith exception. The Supreme
Court will have to weigh this danger against the harms of releasing
suspected criminals.15 2
The good faith exception also seems to put a premium on police ig-
norance of citizens' rights. Police departments might train their officers
poorly, hoping that the courts will characterize any unlawful searches
as good faith mistakes. 153 The objective reasonableness requirement 154
adopted by the Williams court appears, however, to preclude such a
problem. A mistake made by an officer due to inadequate fourth
amendment training would probably be deemed unreasonable by the
courts. 155 Therefore, police departments will still have an incentive to
train their officers properly.
Commentators have also objected to the addition of a fact finding
process that includes the difficult task of probing states of mind. The
concern is that this determination will burden the courts'5 6 and that the
risk of inaccurate decisions will increase substantially.157 This problem
is offset partially by a reduction in adjudicating technical fourth
amendment questions.158 In addition, the advantage of obtaining valid
150. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. One commentator has argued that the difficulty
of discerning subjective intent requires that good faith be judged by an objective standard. She
asserts that a majority of the current Supreme Court might not find it objectionable for evidence
seized in subjective bad faith to be admitted if it objectively appears that the seizure resulted from
a good faith mistake. See Ball, supra note 51, at 654-55.
151. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
152. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
153. See Kaplan, supra note 17, at 1044.
It would put a premium on the ignorance of the police officer and, more significantly, on
the department which trains him. A police department dedicated to crime control values
would presumably have every incentive to leave its policemen as uneducated as possible
so that a large percentage of their constitutional violations properly could be labeled as
inadvertent.
Id. See generally Hyman, In Pursuit of a More Workable Excluslonary Rule: A Police Officers
Perspective, 10 PAC. LJ. 33, 51-53 (1978).
154. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
155. See, eg., Israel, supra note 149, at 1413. But see Kaplan, supra note 17, at 1044.
156. See Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an "Illogical" or 'Unnatural' Interpretatlon of the
Fourth Amendment?, 62 JuD. 66, 84 n.112 (1978); Kaplan, supra note 17, at 1045.
157. Kamisar, supra note 156, at 84; Kaplan, supra note 17, at 1045.
158. See H. FRIENDLY, supra note 132, at 262.
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criminal convictions probably outweighs the judicial inconvenience of
determining the existence of good faith. 159
The difficulty of probing an officer's subjective beliefs and in dis-
proving an officer's allegations of good faith"6 nevertheless will tax ju-
dicial fact finding resources. It is possible that the Williams test will
become primarily an objective test 6' of police good faith. Courts faced
with the impossible task of determining a police officer's state of mind
probably will not make individual inquiries in each case. Instead, the
court will determine whether it was objectively reasonable for the po-
lice officer to believe that his search was legal.
Justice Brennan has expressed the fear that a good faith exception
will retard development of the fourth amendment.1 62 He asserts that
motions to suppress will be denied if precedent does not clearly estab-
lish the illegality of particular conduct. This would eliminate opportu-
nities to litigate novel fourth amendment claims.1 63 One commentator
has responded that "it is perhaps overly pessimistic to fear that the law
will stop dead in its tracks."' 6 Moreover, a mere lack of clear prece-
dent on identical facts would not automatically require denial of mo-
tions to suppress.' 65 Although the good faith exception will, if adopted,
profoundly alter the operation of the exclusionary rule, it is doubtful
159. Id. Judge Friendly contends: "Even if there were an added burden, most judges would
prefer to discharge it than have to perform the distasteful duty of allowing a dangerous criminal to
go free because of a slight and unintentional miscalculation by the police." Id.
160. See, e.g., Foote, supra note 17, at 493; Kamisar, su.pra note 156, at 84 n.112; Kaplan,
spra note 17, at 1045; Theis, supra note 149, at 1024.
161. See note 149 supra. See generally Comment, Fourth Amendment in the Balance-The
Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powel, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 611, 626-28 (1975) (discussion of a
good faith standard the Supreme Court might adopt).
162. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 554 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Bren-
nan contends:
This new doctrine could stop dead in its tracks judicial development of Fourth Amend-
ment rights. For if evidence is to be admitted in criminal trials in the absence of clear
precedent declaring the search in question unconstitutional, the first duty of a court will
be to deny the accused's motion to suppress if he cannot cite a case invalidating a search
or seizure on identical facts.
Id.
163. Id.
164. Ball, supra note 51, at 655.
165. See Israel, supra note 149, at 1415. The Williams court did not, however, specify whether
a court confronted with a suppression question must first rule on the fourth amendment's applica-
uon before finding whether the police acted in good faith. If courts do not first rule on the fourth
amendment's application there is at least some doubt whether the fourth amendment can continue
to develop. See 622 F.2d at 846-47.
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that the courts will give up their commitment to developing the fourth
amendment.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court must decide whether the potential
increase in convictions resulting from the good faith violation rule out-
weighs the potential increase in fourth amendment violations caused by
police officers searching in questionable situations or fraudulently
claiming good faith. The Court's dismissal of the judicial integrity 166
and personal rights 67 arguments leaves only the tension inherent in
this balancing process. 6 ' The Court's decision would be easier if these
concerns could be quantified. Even after numerous studies, though, the
effectiveness of the exclusionary rule has not been established. 169 It is
therefore unlikely that the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule in the
context of good faith violations can be quantified. The Supreme
Court's eventual decision of the issue therefore must rest on an intuitive
weighing of constitutional protections and societal good.
IV. CONCLUSION
As the dissent in Williams predicted, the Supreme Court did refuse
to review the case because of the separate ground for decision
presented in the majority opinion.7 0 Nevertheless, the Court will
likely have an opportunity soon to consider specifically the good faith
mistake exception to the exclusionary rule.
The Williams decision has already provoked comment from several
courts, and it is likely that other federal circuit courts and some state
courts will adopt its reasoning.' The Tenth Circuit cited the Williams
opinion as precedent in refusing to give retroactive effect to a Supreme
Court opinion applying the exclusionary rule to warrantless adminis-
trative inspections. 7 2 The Eighth Circuit has also cited the Williams
166. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
167. See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
168. See notes 148-52 supra and accompanying text.
169. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
170. 622 F.2d at 851 (Rubin, J., concurring specially). The specially concurring judge stated
that "the announcement of the rule as an alternative ground for decision in a case where all the
court agrees on the result virtually immunizes this case from Supreme Court review." Id. (Rubin,
J., concurring specially). The Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for certiorari. Wil-
liams v. United States, 449 U.S. 127 (1981).
171. Williams has also provoked extensive comment from commentators. See, e.g., 15 GA. L.
REv. 487 (1981); 32 MERCER L. REV. 1329 (1981); 13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 179 (1981); 34 VAND. L.
REv. 213 (1981).
172. Robberson v. Marshall, 645 F.2d 22, 22 (10th Cir. 1980).
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opinion. 173 Neither circuit, however, has yet adopted a good faith mis-
take exception. The Supreme Court of Colorado has twice endorsed
the Williams opinion in dicta,"74 and New York trial courts have cited
Williams in technical good faith violation cases. 75
The Second Circuit, however, refused to adopt the Williams good
faith exception, stating that even though the issue of good faith "will
undoubtedly enter into the Court's handling of the exclusionary rule,"
the courts should not "endorse vague headings which add little to our
understanding of the problems and which, because of their symbolic
impact, may lead inadvertently to a weakening of the fourth amend-
ment protection."1 76 The Supreme Court of Virginia has also refused
to create a good faith exception, 77 although it admits to being "per-
suaded by the logic in Williams."178 In addition, a federal district court
in Illinois has refused to apply the good faith exception to a United
States Attorney's good faith abuse of grand jury subpoena powers. 179
As more courts endorse or reject Williams, the likelihood of the
Supreme Court being confronted with the issue increases.
Justice White has claimed that four or more Justices on the current
Court would like to alter the exclusionary rule.1 18 As long as the Court
views deterrence as the main justification for the exclusionary rule, a
good faith mistake exception is a logical alteration.
The Court must, of course, weigh the likelihood of increased fourth
amendment violations, fraud, and overburdening of the courts. These
problems would be unique to the good faith mistake exception. 8' This
task is made even more difficult by the lack of reliable empirical data
available to the Court.'82 Nevertheless, the Court has addressed exclu-
173. United States v. Barnes, 634 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1980). Several district courts have
also noted Williams in dicta. See, tg., United States v. Lawson, 502 F. Supp. 158 (D. Md. 1980);
United States v. Wayne, 499 F. Supp. 664 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
174. See People v. Smith, 620 P.2d 232,235 n.4 (Colo. 1981); People v. Eichelberger, 620 P.2d
1067, 1071 n.2 (Colo. 1980).
175. See People v. Arnow, 108 Misc.2d 128, _ 436 N.Y.S.2d 950, 953 (Sup. Ct. 1981); People
v. Lent, 105 Misc.2d 831, 835, 433 N.Y.S.2d 538, 540 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
176. United States v. Alvarez-Porras, 643 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981).
177. Abell v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 607, -, 272 S.E.2d 204, 210 (Va. 1980).
178. Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 947, -, 275 S.E.2d 620, 622 (Va. 1981).
179. United States v. Santucci, 509 F. Supp. 177, 182-83 (N.D. lL 1981).
180. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 537 (1976) (White, J., dissenting). But see Abel v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 607,-, 272 S.E.2d 204, 210 (Va. 1980) ("[w]e can find no disposition on
the part of the Supreme Court to permit a good-faith exception").
181. See notes 128-69 supra and accompanying text.
182. See note 18 supra.
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sionary rule problems before without the aid of empirical data, and the
current interest of the Burger Court in crime control suggests that the
Supreme Court will rule on the issue in the near future.
Robert Oliver Lesley
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